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Current intelligence  
Where copyright ends, trade mark may begin: the EFTA Court allows relay races of intellectual 
property rights over artworks 
EFTA, 6 April 2017, Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo 
In April 2017, the EFTA Court confirmed that out-of-copyright works can be registered as 
trade marks without - in principle - being in breach of the public policy or morality exclusions, 
as long as the sign is neither descriptive nor lacking distinctiveness.  
 
Legal context and facts 
The municipality of Oslo manages the rights vested in the works of various Norwegian artists, not 
least of all, the famous sculptor Gustav Vigeland. Shortly before the lapse of the copyright protection 
covering these works, the municipality applied to register as trade marks close to ninety pieces of 
visual art and sculptures. A number of these applications - notably those seeking to register 
photographs of Vigeland’s sculptures - were rejected by the Intellectual Property Office of Norway 
(NIPO). According to NIPO, the municipality’s applications fell foul of the absolute grounds laid 
down by Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive,1 namely: the lack of distinctive character of the mark 
(Article 3(b)); the descriptive nature of the mark (Article 3(c)); and the limitation placed upon shapes 
which grant substantial value to the goods (Article 3(c)). The refusal was appealed by the 
municipality of Oslo before the Board of Appeal for Industrial Rights who then referred the case to 
the EFTA Court. The latter holds a similar function with regard to EFTA countries (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) the ECJ holds towards EU Member States. 
The referral seeks the EFTA Court’s interpretation of Article 3 of the Trade Mark Directive in relation 
to works of art that have recently entered the public domain. In their request, the Board of Appeal 
stresses the potential contradiction between the registration of such signs as trade mark and the ‘public 
policy’ or ‘morality’ exclusions found under Article 3(f) of the directive, raising thereby a fourth 
ground for refusal. 
This deferral by NIPO was made against the backdrop of a German judicial precedent known as the 
Mona Lisa case (Case 24 W (pat) 188/96, GRUR 1998, p. 1021) in which the German Patent Court 
rejected the registration as trade mark of Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa for it lacked distinctiveness 
due to its frequent use in advertising and trade. In the Norwegian dispute, the Board of Appeal noted 
that if distinctiveness was to be the only condition standing in the way of registering well-known 
pieces of art under trade mark law, the possibility to register the same material at a later date remained 
as distinctiveness can be secured through use. In this logic, it would only be a matter of time before 
popular creative works can be reclaimed from the public domain by trade mark rights, following the 
expiry of the copyright term. To address this concern, NIPO proposes in their referral request to 
envisage the limitations provided by Article 3(1)(f), broadening the scope of the public policy or 
morality exclusions to avoid the creation of new monopolies on out-of-protection works.  
Analysis  
The Board of Appeal submitted six questions, to which the Norwegian’s government added a seventh 
by challenging the admissibility of a referral to the EFTA Court coming from a sub-section of NIPO 
(33-34).2 Starting with the last, the Court quickly dismissed the argument according to which the case 
should have been heard by a national court before reaching the EFTA judges in accordance the terms 
of the agreement establishing its jurisdiction (34).3 They concluded that the notion of “court or 
tribunal” was to be given an autonomous meaning in the context of the EFTA agreement (36), and 
that in many regards the Board of Appeal did operate in a fashion similar to a judicial body, and as 
such, satisfied the procedural conditions of referral before the EFTA Court (38-40).  
Article 3(1)(f) 
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The EFTA Court then moved to whether the registration of works “for which the copyright protection 
period had expired, under certain circumstances, conflict with the prohibition in Article 3(1)(f) of the 
Trade Mark Directive on registering trade marks that are contrary to “public policy or…accepted 
principles of morality”; whether the popularity or cultural value of the artworks at stake should be 
taken into account in such assessment; and whether any other factors should be included when 
applying such test (31). The Court began their analysis by stressing that exclusions on the basis of 
‘public policy’, and exclusions on the basis of ‘morality’ were distinct grounds for exclusions (85). As 
such, each ground hold its own standards ; public policy is described as requiring an objective 
assessment whilst morality would operate on the basis of “subjective values” (86). 
Principles of morality 
For a sign to be regarded as contrary to principles of morality, the signs must be “in and of themselves 
offensive” in the eyes of “reasonable consumers with average sensitivity and tolerance thresholds” 
(90). In this case, the Court considers that this threshold is not met but the judges do not rule out the 
hypothesis where the registration of a cultural work could offend the sensitivity of consumers and be 
sanctioned for it under Article 3(1)(f). The EFTA Court refers to situations where the pieces of art at 
stake “may enjoy a particular status as prominent parts of a nation’s cultural heritage” or the 
registration of such pieces be regarded as a “misappropriation or a desecration of the artist’s work” 
(92) as hypotheses were the registration could be regarded as contrary to principles of morality by 
national authorities (92). The EFTA panel confirmed that such test is bound to be applied on a case-
per-case basis taking into consideration national circumstances (93).  
Public policy 
The EFTA judgment reasserts that the exclusion based on “public policy” is also to be interpreted in 
light of national perspectives (95) and remains limited to “serious and genuine threat[s] to certain 
fundamental values, or where the need to safeguard the public domain, itself, is considered a 
fundamental interest of society” (96). Whether these conditions are verified in the present dispute is a 
matter for the NITO to decide (93). In the absence of national circumstances, registering a work 
belonging to the public domain on the basis of copyright law is not in itself contrary to public policy 
(88, 102). This is in part, according to the EFTA Court, because the respective functions of copyright 
and trade mark differ - copyright is dedicated to safeguarding and emulating creativity whilst trade 
mark “guarantee[s] the identity of the origin of the marketed product” and “ensure […] undistorted 
competition” (63,67). As a result, the two bodies of law cannot contradict each other per se, so much 
so that the two kinds of intellectual property rights may lawfully relay each other when one ends (62).  
On this basis, the EFTA Court concluded that  “[a] sign that consists of works for which the copyright 
protection period had expired as a trade mark is not itself contrary to public policy or accepted 
principles of morality” as per the terms of the Trade Mark Directive (88, 102). 
Shapes that gives substantial value to the goods  
NITO also sought the guidance of the EFTA Court with regard to the applicability of the limitation 
found under Article 3(1)(e)iii of the Trade Mark Directive which excludes the registration of signs 
whose “shape” confers substantial value to the goods. Whilst the limitation most readily applies to 
three-dimensional marks, the Board of Appeal enquired whether the term “shape” could also include 
two-dimensional signs, such as the photographic reproductions of three-dimensional artworks - here 
photographs or drawings of sculptures. The Court responded to the affirmative (115), holding that the 
directive “makes no distinction between three-dimensional shapes, two-dimensional shapes or two-
dimensional representations of three-dimensional shapes” (112) in its provision for it provides no 
definition of the word (“shape”) that would be specific to Article 3(1)(e)iii (112).  
Descriptiveness and distinctiveness  
The EFTA also confirmed that Article 3(1)(c), limiting the registration of signs descriptive of the 
goods or services they are associated with in the application, applies to both three-dimensional signs 
and two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional items (127). That said, the descriptive 
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nature of the photographic reproductions of Vigeland’s sculptures would bar registration only if the 
latter is sought in relation to goods or services the average consumer would relate to the cultural or 
creative sector (see, European Copyright Society, Trade mark protection of public domain works: A 
comment on the request for an advisory opinion of the EFTA Court (1 November 2016) 11-12). The 
judgment of the EFTA Court makes no reference to the types of goods or services for which 
registration was sought in this case. In any event, the assessment of the descriptive nature of the signs 
would be a task carried out by national authorities (intellectual property offices and/or national 
courts).  
On the question of distinctiveness, the EFTA judges were asked which “criteria [were] relevant under 
Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of the Trade Mark Directive in the assessment of an application to register a 
trade mark” (128). In its response, the Court made little reference to the specifics of the case, and nor 
did it tailor its interpretation to the issue of marks representing well-known artworks particularly. 
Instead, the judgment refers to the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, and re-states that “the 
distinctive character of a mark must be, according to established case law, assess in relation, on the 
one hand, to the goods and services covered by that mark and, on the other, to the presumed 
expectations of the relevant class of persons, that is to say, an average consumer of the category of 
goods and services in question who is reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect.” (139, 
see also 141).  
Practical significance 
Whilst the decision confirms that creative works within the (copyright) public domain may be 
registered as trade marks, it also reasserts the leeway EEA States have in recognising extenuating 
national circumstances where such applications could be rejected, according to the cultural status of 
the work, the class of goods or services it is associated with, and whether its national authorities 
declare the safeguard of the public domain paramount. The Court also made reference to the ability 
each EEA States holds to introduce additional grounds for refusal or exceptions to trade mark 
registration by virtue of Article 4(4)(c)iii.  
This decision revives controversial debates on the control exercised by cultural institutions (museums, 
galleries, etc.) over out-of-protection works through the implementation of intellectual property rights. 
Although much of the discussions has until now focused on the use of copyright, especially in the 
context of digital reproductions of artworks, it appears that new avenues may be opened in direction 
of trade mark law. However, the financial and management costs borne by holders of trade mark 
rights - in comparison to copyright - may refrain cultural institutions from investing too heavily in 
their portfolio in such way in practice.  
 
Mathilde Pavis 
University of Exeter 
Email: M.Pavis@exeter.ac.uk 
                                                            
1 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks ; Official Journal of the European Union L 299/25 
2
 Numbers in brackets refer back to the relevant paragraphs of the EFTA judgment.  
3
 Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, 
OJ L 344, 31.1.1994, p. 3, Article 34, p.10.  
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